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Abstract

Many empirical studies document the value effect. One explanation is that
investors overreact to growth aspects for growth stocks. We apply Stein's (1989) method
to investigate whether the degree of overreaction differs between value and growth stocks
using the implied volatility from option prices. A finding of overreaction for either value
stocks or growth stocks would lend support to overreaction as an explanation for the
value effect. Empirical results here indicate a stronger degree of overreaction for growth
stocks.
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Is Overreaction an Explanation for the Value Effect? A Study Using Implied
Volatility from Option Prices

I.

Introduction
Many empirical studies indicate that value stocks outperform growth
stocks in the long term, either measured by total return or risk-adjusted return
(e.g., Fama and French. (1992, 1996); Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994);
Bauman and Miller, (1997)). The explanations for the value stock effect however
are not clear. Efficient market arguments (e.g., Fama and French, (1992)) suggest
that small firms with low price-to-book ratio may be riskier and as a result
command higher risk premium. On the other hand, the rationale behind value
investing is that investors overreact to lack of growth opportunities for value
stocks and/or they overreact to growth prospects for growth stocks (e.g., Graham
(1962)); consequently value stocks may be under-priced while growth stocks
over-priced. The issue has important implications for individual investors as well
as institutional ones. For instance, Morningstar classifies mutual funds’
investment styles into value or growth and small or large oriented. This study
attempts to shed light on the overreaction explanation for the price-to-book effect
by using the methodology first proposed by Stein (1989).
Stein (1989) analyzes the term structure of options’ implied volatility to
infer the degree of investor overreaction. Intuitively, if stock prices have a
tendency to return to their long-term mean, long-term investors revise their
expectations for future volatility to a smaller extent than their short-term
2

counterparts. The expectation for future volatility can be inferred from option
prices, commonly referred to as implied volatility. Therefore, implied volatility is
the current consensus of anticipated future volatility by market participants and it
reflects the market sentiment for the underlying security. Stein’s (1989) empirical
results using S&P 100 index options show that implied volatility for long-term
options moves almost in lockstep with short-term options, thereby suggesting
overreactions. However, Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst
(1994) show that the degree of overreaction is sensitive to statistical specifications
and assumptions about the underlying stock return generating process.
This paper applies Stein’s (1989) method to investigate whether the degree
of overreaction differs between value and growth stocks. To the authors’
knowledge, there is no similar research on this issue. One study that is somewhat
related is the one by La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). They
examine stock price reactions to earnings announcements and conclude that a
significant portion (roughly one third of the first two years) of the return
difference between value and growth stocks is explained by systematically more
positive earnings surprises for value stocks. Bauman and Miller (1997) document
similar findings. However, none of these studies directly infer investors’
expectations.
A finding of overreaction for either value stocks or growth stocks could
lend support to overreaction as an explanation for the value stock effect. Absence
of overreaction could be interpreted as evidence that investors in various types of
stocks are not fundamentally different, which is plausible considering that
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institutional investors hold a large portion of shares and are fairly diversified. The
focus here is whether the degree of overreaction differs between value and growth
stocks. Unless measurement problems are more severe for a particular group of
stocks, these problems as indicated by Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen,
Kemna, and Vorst (1994) would have little effect on the results here. Moreover,
this study estimates implied volatility for individual stocks, as opposed to
previous studies that use index options. The use of individual stocks allows for a
richer set of testing. This paper assumes bull and bear markets separately as the
implied volatility changes may vary across up and down markets.

II.

Relevant Literature

II. 1

Value Stock Effect
Fama and French, (1992, 1996), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994)

and Bauman and Miller (1997) document that value stocks produce higher returns
than growth stocks in the U.S. stock market. Recently Beneda (2002) examines
the performance of growth versus value stock portfolios created during the period
1983-1987. Consistent with prior studies, the five-year returns of value stocks
exceed those of growth stocks. However, the long-term buy-and-hold returns (up
to 18 years) of growth stocks are higher than those of value stocks for portfolios
created during the years included in the study. Nevertheless, it is likely that, after
a five-year run-up, some value stocks would be classified as growth stocks.
Furthermore, her time period mainly covers 1990s, a period when growth stocks
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perform exceptionally well. The stock returns are not adjusted for market returns
as well.
In addition to the considerable empirical research for the U.S. stock
market, some studies compare the performances of value and growth stocks in the
stock markets in other countries. Value and growth stocks may perform
differently in non-U.S. markets because of the variations in investors’ behavior
and/or market conditions. For example, Bauman (1996) observes that the
availability, quality, and timeliness of research information vary substantially
from one country to another. Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993), using price-tobook ratios (P/Bs), find that value stocks outperformed growth stocks in France,
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom in the 1981-1992 period. Fama and
French (1998) conclude that value stocks tend to have higher returns than growth
stocks in 12 of 13 major markets during 1975-1995 period and the difference
between average returns on global portfolios of high and low book-to-market
stocks is 7.6% per year.
Researchers have offered two primary explanations for the performance
difference. Fama and French (1992, 1996) suggest that price-to-book and firm
size may proxy for risk. Thus the fact that value stocks might be considerably
riskier than growth stocks account for their superior return. However, Fama and
French (1992) find evidence to the contrary - stocks with low price to book value
ratios are characterized by lower betas. If beta represents the systematic risk of a
stock, value stocks with low price to book ratios are supposed to have higher beta
than growth stocks.
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Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that investors erroneously
extrapolate past earnings growth too far into the future and therefore cause stock
prices to deviate from their 'fundamental' value. Future earnings of firms that
recently performed badly - more likely to be relatively small and have a high
book-to-market ratio - are underestimated, whereas growth stocks or large stocks
are overestimated. Based on the stock price reactions around earnings
announcement for value and growth stocks over a five-year period after portfolio
formation, La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that a
significant portion of return difference between value and growth stocks is
attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value
stock, which is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation for the return
differential. Instead, they argue that value stocks have been underpriced relative
to their risk and return characteristics. Bauman and Miller (1997) enhance the
argument by showing that investment research analysts systematically
overestimate the future earning per share (EPS) of growth stocks relative to value
stocks; as a result, growth stocks experience lower returns subsequently when
realized EPS growth rates are disappointingly lower than those that were
expected.1
The greater information asymmetry inherited in growth stocks can make
growth stocks sensitive to changes in investor sentiment. Copeland and Copeland
(1999) suggest an investing strategy that involves switching between value stocks
and growth stocks. When the estimate of expected future volatility goes up, the
1

Bauman and Miller (1997) observe that the EPS growth rate has a mean-reversion tendency, over
time, in which the high growth rates associated with growth stocks subsequently tend to decline
whereas the low growth rates associated with value stocks tend to increase.
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rising uncertainty about the future might lead to falling confidence in growth
stocks and investors shift into value stocks. When the estimated future volatility
goes down, investors are likely to shift into growth stocks on the assumption that
decreases in expected volatility signal rising confidence in the future, a condition
that favors growth stocks. They find evidence supporting the effectiveness of the
strategy.

II. 2

Term Structure of Implied Volatility
Stein (1989) examines the term structure of implied volatilities, using two

daily time series on implied volatilities for S&P 100 index options over the period
from December 1983 to September 1987. Based on the assumption that the
volatility follows a mean reverting process with a constant long-run mean and a
constant coefficient of mean reversion, changes in long-term implied volatility
should be less than those of short-terms. Instead, he finds that implied volatility of
long-term and short-term options move almost in perfect lockstep. That is, the
correlation between long-term and short-term implied volatility is close to one.
Therefore, he concludes that this presents evidence for overreaction.
Nevertheless, the conclusion has been disputed by Diz and Finucane
(1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994). Diz and Finucane (1993) indicate
that the relation between long and short options cannot be constant. They use
changes in implied volatility as opposed to the level of implied volatility and find
no evidence for overreactions for S&P 100 stock in dex. Heynen, Kemna, and
Vorst (1994) utilize one year’s data on the European Option Exchange and the
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Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They test restrictions on implied volatilities under
mean reverting model, GARCH model and EGARCH model and find that their
conclusion about overreaction depends on the model specifying the process of
price volatility. EGARCH model gives the best description of asset prices and the
term structure of options’ implied volatilities and indicates no overreaction. On
the other hand, assuming mean reverting and GARCH models, the evidence is in
favor of overreaction. Nevertheless, they find that none of the models is
misspecified, as a result they cannot reach defined conclusions on whether
investors overereact to information. Poteshman (2001) examines whether the
long-horizon overreaction documented by Stein (1989) in the OEX market is
present in the S&P 500 (SPX) index options market in a later period. Employing a
standard variance model, he separates daily changes in instantaneous variance
into expected and unexpected parts and assumes investors respond to the
unexpected part when they set option prices. The evidence indicates that SPX
options market investors underreact to daily information and overreact to
extended periods of mostly similar daily information and exhibit increasing
misreaction to daily information as a function of the quantity of previous similar
information.
In summary, the empirical results on the term structure of implied
volatility of options are mixed and the underlying reasons for the different
performance between growth stock and value stocks still remain an open question.
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III. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses:

Stein (1989) assumes that instantaneous volatility σt evolves according to
continuous-time mean reverting AR1 process as follows.
(Equation 1)
dσ t = −α (σ t − σ )dt + βσ t dz

At time t, the expectation of volatility as of time t+j is given by
(Equation 2)

Et (σ t + j ) = σ + ρ j (σ t − σ )

Where ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of short term stock
options at a one-day lag. ρ = e −α < 1 . That is, volatility is expected to decay
geometrically back towards its long-run mean level of σ .
Denoted by Vt(T), the implied volatility at time t on an option with T
remaining until expiration should equal to the averaged expected instantaneous
volatility over the time span [t, t+T]. Using Equation 1, this implies
(Equation 3)

Vt (t ) =

1
T

∫

T
j =o

[σ + ρ j (σ t − σ )]dj = σ +

ρ T −1
[σ t − σ ]
T ln ρ
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Suppose there are two options of different terms to maturity: a short term
option with time to expiration T and implied volatility Vt S (T ) , and a long term

option with time to expiration K, which is n days longer than T (K=T+n) and
implied volatility Vt L (K ) , the following relationship is expected to hold.

(Equation 4)

(Vt L − σ ) = θ ( ρ , T ) * (Vt S − σ )
Where

θ (ρ,T ) =

T ( ρ T + n − 1)
(T + n)( ρ T − 1)

θ represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long term
stock options with respect to that of the short-term option. Given a movement in
the implied volatility of short-term option Vt S , there should be a smaller
movement in the implied volatility of long-term option Vt L . The exact proportion
depends on the mean reversion parameter ρ, as well as on the times to expiration
of the two options.
The model is testable without knowing the long-run mean level of σ by
simply running an OLS regression of Vt L against Vt S . The coefficient of Vt S
represents the actual elasticity of the implied volatility of long term option
contract relative to that of short term one. If the empirical beta is greater than the
theoretical beta, then the long-term contracts overreact to the short-term contracts.
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If the difference between empirical beta and theoretical beta is greater for growth
portfolio than for value portfolio, then there is a greater degree of overreaction in
growth portfolio than in value portfolio, or vice versa.
The main hypothesis to be tested in the paper is that the average variation
of implied volatility of growth stock options over time is higher than that of the
value stock options. In particular, implied volatility of growth stock options may
demonstrate a greater degree of overreaction.

IV.

Data and Methodology

Daily option data from July 2000 to December 2002 provided by Prophet
Financial System, a relatively comprehensive database after Berkley Options
database became unavailable, are used for the study. The dataset include open
price, close price, high and low prices, trading volume and open interests for call
and put contracts of stock options. Daily stock data, interest rates, and accounting
data are extracted from CRSP and Compustat.
We restrict the sample to stocks within S&P 100 index to ensure relatively
active trading of each stock and a continuous time-series of implied volatility for
analysis. A continuous time series of implied volatility is critical to calculate ρ,
the autocorrelation coefficient of the implied volatility of short term option series,
an input for the latter computation of theoretical theta. The theoretical theta will
not be reliable if ρ is found from a discontinuous time series. In addition, without
active trading in a stock option, the implied volatility would be constant, which is
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against the objective of the study, to compare the degree of changes in implied
volatility between value and growth stocks. S&P 100 stocks meet the criterion of
the study since they are widely traded and comprise of stocks with various growth
aspects, which enable us to classify them into growth and value portfolios. In the
case of any possible non-trading days for certain sample stocks, I delete the
observation before building the equally weighted implied volatility series of value
and growth portfolios.
The finance literature generally classifies value stocks and growth stocks
according to the earning yield and book-to-market value ratios. Typically, value
stocks are those whose market price is relatively low in relation to earnings per
share (Basu 1977), cash flow per share (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994),
book value per share (Fama and French 1992), and dividends per share (Blume
1980 and Rozeff 1984). In comparison, growth stocks have been defined as
having relatively high prices in relation to those same fundamental factors, as well
as high past rates of growth in EPS.
However, there was no one variable that appeared to be better than the
others in identifying value stocks that outperformed the market. In Lakonishok,
Schleifer, and Vishny’s (1994) study, price/cash flow appears to be an indicator of
value that leads to more significant mean difference than price/earnings or
price/book value. In Bauman, Conover and Miller’s (1998) study, price/book
value rather than price/earnings, price/cash flow, or dividend yield is the indicator
of value that reports a more significant mean difference. Fama and French (1998)
classify value and growth portfolios formed on four measures, book-to-market
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(B/M), earning to price (E/P), cash flow to price (C/P) and dividend to price ratios
(D/P) respectively. The value portfolio includes firms whose B/M, E/P, C/P or
D/P are among the highest 30% for a country, and growth firms include firms in
the bottom 30%. In this paper, we rank the S&P 100 stocks by their price to
earning ratio (P/E). The top 30% is classified as growth portfolio, and the bottom
30% falls into value portfolio. The remaining 40% are eliminated.
The initial dataset of S&P 100 contains about ten million records over the
sample period from 2000 to 2002. Eliminating 40% of the initial set, that is
neither growth nor value stock, we end up with six million observations. Since
there might be multiple option contracts with different strike prices matured on
the same day and not all of them contain active trading records, we need to screen
the dataset and retain one option contract with a relatively large number of
observations for each sample stock each month and build continuous short term
and long term series. The screening criterion is to retain the contracts with the
least number of observations with the same open price, close price, high price,
and low price. This enables retaining contracts with active trading for the
calculation of implied volatility.
For the purpose of estimating implied volatility, we use the Binomial
Option Pricing model by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). It explicitly accounts
for the dividend yield on the stock option and for the possibility of early exercise
to calculate the implied volatility. After deriving the implied volatility of
individual stock, we create two time series for both value and growth portfolios.
The short term series consists of observations with one day up to one month to
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expiration. The long term series consists of observations with thirty one days up
to two months to expiration.
Moreover, for each time series implied volatility is calculated by
averaging the implied volatility of call and put contracts near the money. Then
we build the equally weighted implied volatility of value or growth portfolios by
averaging out the implied volatility of all the stocks in value or growth portfolios
on each day. Eventually we have a total of 648 daily observations for each series
from July 2000 to December 2002 for analysis. The last step is to derive the
empirical theta and compare it with theoretical theta. We run OLS regressions of
Vt L against Vt S for each portfolio and also t tests.

V.

Empirical results

Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis of the short term and long term
series of value and growth portfolios for the full sample period and for each year.
Mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum implied volatilities
are reported. The mean and median implied volatilities of growth portfolio are
overall higher than those of value portfolio for both short term and long term
series. For the whole time period from 2000 to 2002, the mean short term implied
volatility of growth portfolio is 48.86%, whereas that of value portfolio is
39.79%. The mean long term implied volatility is shown to be a bit lower than
short term one with 47.44% for the growth portfolio and 38.01% for the value
portfolio.
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We also compare the level and daily changes of implied volatility of value
and growth portfolios for both series over the sample period as shown in Chart 1,
Chart 2, Chart 3, and Chart 4. The daily changes in implied volatility of growth
portfolios are consistently higher than those of value portfolios throughout the
sample period from 2000 to 2002. For both portfolios daily changes in implied
volatility are larger in 2000 and 2001 than in 2002, consistent with the fact that
stock market got volatile starting early 2000.
Assuming the stochastic process of implied volatility follows a mean
reversion process decaying geometrically back to its long-term mean, the serial
correlation properties of the instantaneous volatility σt are of interest to derive
theoretical upper bounds for the elasticity of long-term implied volatility with
respect to short-term implied volatility. The estimates of ρ for value and growth
portfolios are listed in Table 2. ρ of value portfolio is 0.845, and that of growth
portfolio is 0.793. They are used in calculating the theoretical beta. The daily
implied volatility at each lag length is also reported.
The theoretical theta depends on both the decay parameter ρ and the time
to expiration T of the short term option series. Thus it varies over a range of
values. The theoretical thetas for value and growth portfolios as shown in
Equation 5 are calculated and presented in Table 3. Three ρ values and six
possible terms to expiration ranging from 5 days to 30 days are used to calculate
the theoretical theta. As the long term option series in the study has one month
longer time to expiration than the short term series, the theoretical theta value
ranges from 0.1768 to 0.5236, getting larger as ρ gets larger given the same time
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to expiration. For example, when ρ is 0.9 and the short term option contract has
30 days to expiration, the theoretical value of theta is 0.5212. That is, if the long
term options of a stock are priced rationally relative to the short term options, then
when the short term volatility is one point above its mean, the long term implied
volatility should be at most about 0.5212 percent above its mean.
Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions of Vt L against Vt S to test
whether the theoretical theta holds empirically, for the full sample period and for
each year run separately. For the full sample period, the coefficients of growth
portfolio and value portfolio are 0.751 and 0.641, higher than the average
plausible theoretical thetas of 0.3666 and 0.3343 respectively. That is, the long
term option series overreacts to short term series for both value and growth
portfolios. The difference between empirical theta and theoretical theta is 0.3844
for the growth portfolio, and 0.3067 for the value portfolio. The growth investors
overreact to a greater degree than value investors by 0.0777 during the full sample
period. For each single year, the coefficients are higher than theoretical values for
both value and growth portfolios as well. In particular, Growth portfolios appear
to have a larger difference of thetas than value portfolios.
T tests in Table 5 enhance the regression results by comparing daily data
of the empirical theta with the theoretical theta. The empirical thetas are found
significantly higher than the theoretical theta for the full sample period as well as
each single year. Overall, the evidence indicates that growth portfolios overreact
to a larger extent than the value portfolios, consistent with overreaction as an
explanation to the value effect.
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VI.

Conclusions

The empirical results from the comparison of the degree of overreactions
between value and growth portfolios using implied volatility from option prices
contributes to the existing literature as a support to overreaction as an explanation
to the value effect. Investors holding different portfolios are fundamentally
different and have different expectations on the future volatility of the portfolios.
The findings for the sample period from 2000 to 2002 do indicate a relatively
large degree of overreactions in growth stocks. This implies that investors are not
well diversified, and instead overreact more to news for growth stocks than for
value stocks. Future research is expected to cover the comparison from 1997 up to
2000 to find out whether the degree of overreaction of growth and value
portfolios varies across the up and down markets.
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Table 1: Descriptive Analysis of the Implied Volatility of Short Term and Long
Term Option Series of Value and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from
2000 to 2002
(S) represents the summary of short term series of option contracts, and (L) represents the summary of long
term series of option contracts.

Sample Period

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

(S)
(L)

0.3979
0.3801

0.3855
0.3743

0.0716
0.0663

0.1931
0.2013

0.6785
0.5937

(S)
(L)

0.4075
0.4058

0.3902
0.4133

0.0940
0.0856

0.2128
0.2246

0.6785
0.5937

(S)
(L)

0.4029
0.3783

0.4026
0.3782

0.0696
0.0595

0.1931
0.2013

0.5686
0.5203

(S)
(L)

0.3883
0.3693

0.3756
0.3582

0.0589
0.0583

0.2489
0.2654

0.5874
0.5552

(S)
(L)

0.4886
0.4744

0.4724
0.4638

0.0812
0.0659

0.2493
0.2781

0.7472
0.6751

(S)
(L)

0.4752
0.4650

0.4646
0.4588

0.0965
0.0757

0.2493
0.2781

0.7090
0.6751

(S)
(L)

0.5188
0.5011

0.5184
0.5012

0.0824
0.0671

0.3430
0.3455

0.7386
0.6555

(S)
(L)

0.4649
0.4523

0.4458
0.4359

0.0600
0.0480

0.3356
0.3485

0.6429
0.5685

Value Portfolio:

Full Sample
2000
2001
2002

Growth Portfolio:

Full Sample
2000
2001
2002
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Table 2:
Autocorrelation and Partial Correlation Coefficients for the Implied Volatility of
Short Term Option Series of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period
from 2000 to 2002
Implied daily ρis the autocorrelation raised to the 1/n power, where n is the lag length in days.

Lag length
(days)

Autocorrelation

Partial Correlation

Implied daily ρ

Value Portfolio:

1

0.845

(0.087)

0.845 (0.088)

0.845

2

0.776

(0.087)

0.215 (0.088)

0.881

3

0.660

(0.087)

-0.135 (0.088)

0.871

4

0.595

(0.086)

0.060 (0.088)

0.878

5

0.548

(0.086)

-0.104 (0.088)

0.886

6

0.502

(0.086)

-0.005 (0.088)

0.891

7

0.480

(0.085)

0.060 (0.088)

0.900

8

0.453

(0.085)

0.340 (0.088)

0.906

Growth Portfolio:

1

0.793

(0.087)

0.793 (0.088)

0.793

2

0.701

(0.087)

0.197 (0.088)

0.837

3

0.631

(0.087)

0.081 (0.088)

0.858

4

0.591

(0.086)

0.092 (0.088)

0.876

5

0.539

(0.086)

0.011 (0.088)

0.883

6

0.544

(0.086)

0.152 (0.088)

0.904

7

0.493

(0.085)

-0.054 (0.088)

0.904

8

0.476

(0.085)

0.055 (0.088)

0.911
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Table 3:

T ( ρ T + n − 1)
Theoretical Value of θ ( ρ , T ) =
(T + n)( ρ T − 1)
θ represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long-term options with respect to that of
the short term options. ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of short term options series
at a one-day lag, T is the time to expiration of the short term option, and the time to expiration of the long
term option is n days longer than T. (n=30 days for the Table)

T = No. of days

ρ=0.7

ρ=0.8

ρ=0.9

5

0.1717

0.2124

0.3401

10

0.2573

0.2800

0.3782

15

0.3349

0.3455

0.4161

20

0.4003

0.4047

0.4530

25

0.4546

0.4563

0.4882

29

0.5000

0.5006

0.5212
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Table 4:
Regressions of the Long Term Implied Volatility onto the Short Term Implied
Volatility of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002

Coefficient

Standard Error

R2

Full Sample

0.641

0.026

0.479

2000

0.645

0.047

0.488

2001

0.620

0.037

0.525

2002

0.637

0.058

0.421

Full Sample

0.751

0.012

0.856

2000

0.759

0.017

0.938

2001

0.723

0.024

0.786

2002

0.731

0.020

0.832

Sample Period
Value Portfolio:

Growth Portfolio:
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Table 5:
One-Sample T-test of Empirical Value of Theta in Comparison with Theoretical
T ( ρ T + n − 1)
Value of θ ( ρ , T ) =
for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
(T + n)( ρ T − 1)
Theoretical theta below is the average theta value for the corresponding sample period.
θ ( ρ , T ) represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long term options with respect to
that of the short term options. ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of the short term
option series at a one-day lag, T is the time to expiration of the short term option, and the time to expiration
of the long term option is n days longer than T.

Sample Period

Empirical Theta

Theoretical Theta

T-Stat

p-value
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Full sample
2000
2001
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Growth Portfolio:

Full sample
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Chart 1: A Comparison of the Level of Implied Volatility of Short Term Option Series of Value
and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
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Chart 2: A Comparison of the Level of Implied Volatility of Long Term Option Series of Value
and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
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Chart 3: A Comparison of Daily Changes in Short Term Implied Volatility of value and Growth
Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
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Chart 4: A Comparison of Daily Changes in Long Term Implied Volatility of Value and Growth
Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
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